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CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY LIMIT ON RECOVERY OF NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS DOES NOT
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
Fein v. Permanente Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 106 S.
Ct. 214 (1985).
In Fein v. Permanente Group,' a sharply divided California Supreme
Court employed a deferential standard of review in rejecting an equal
protection challenge to a statutory ceiling on the amount recoverable for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions.2
The plaintiff, Lawrence Fein, went to the hospital after experiencing
intermittent chest pains.3 A physician suggested that muscle spasms had
caused the pain and sent Fein home.4 The next day, however, Fein suf-
1. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
The Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal from the California decision, "for want of a substan-
tial federal question," has had an uncertain effect upon state court decisions striking down damage
limitations on equal protection grounds.
Congress has provided for Supreme Court review of state supreme court decisions. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1982). The statute permits review by either appeal or certiorari.
When a state statute is challenged on federal constitutional grounds, the outcome of the decision
determines the appropriate mode of review. If the state court upholds the validity of the statute,
appeal may be had as of right. On the other hand, if the court finds the statute unconstitutional,
review is available only by certiorari.
The right to direct appeal, however, does not automatically include the right to oral argument and
briefs on the merits. The court is only obligated to review the preliminary jurisdictional papers,
which require a demonstration that the issues raised on appeal are "substantial" from the standpoint
of federal constitutional protections. The court may find the issues unsubstantial and summarily
dismiss the action "for want of a substantial federal question." L.C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E.
COOPER & R. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4014 (1977).
Even though such a dismissal is ostensibly based on jurisdictional grounds, the Supreme Court has
held that such a dismissal is an adjudication on the merits. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1974). The Court qualified its precedential effect, however, explaining that such action is only
binding if the issues presented in a subsequent case are "sufficiently the same" as those in the dis-
missed case. Id. at 345 n.14.
For a discussion of the binding effect of the dismissal see generally, Note, Summary Disposition of
Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent,
52 B.U.L. REV. 373 (1972); Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Court
for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 508 (1976).
2. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
3. Id. at 144-45, 695 P.2d at 669, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
4. Id.
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fered a heart attack.' Fein sued Permanente Medical Group, a partner-
ship of physicians, alleging negligent failure to diagnose and treat an
impending heart attack.6
A jury awarded Fein actual damages7 and 500,000 dollars for
noneconomic damages.' Permanente moved to modify the award in ac-
cordance with the Medical Injury Compensation Recovery Act
(MICRA),9 which places a 250,000 dollar ceiling on the amount recover-
able for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions.10 Pursu-
ant to the motion, the trial court reduced the noneconomic damage
award to 250,000 dollars.'1  On appeal,' 2 the California Supreme Court
affirmed and held: the statutory limitation on the amount recoverable for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions did not violate the
equal protection clause.13
The California Legislature enacted MICRA in 1975 in response to a
well-publicized "crisis"' 4 in California's 5 medical malpractice insurance
5. Id.
6. Id. at 144, 695 P.2d at 670, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
7. The jury awarded $724,733 for lost wages and $63,000 for future medical expenses. Id.
8. Id. The noneconomic damage award compensated for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physi-
cal impairment, and other intangible damage sustained by plaintiff. Id.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1982). Section 3333.2 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any [medical malpractice] action ... the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover
noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
disfigurement, and other non-pecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two-hundred
fifty-thousand dollars ($250,000).
10. 38 Cal. 3d at 146, 695 P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
11. Id.
12. Id. The defendant argued that the trial court erred by (I) excusing certain members from
the jury, (2) instructing the jury on the duty of care of a nurse practitioner, (3) instructing the jury
on causation, (4) permitting the plaintiff to recover wages lost because of his diminished life expec-
tancy, and (5) refusing to order periodic payment of all future damages.
Fein contended that the limitation on recovery of noneconomic damages was unconstitutional on
due process and equal protection grounds. Id.
13. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 684, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
14. See Malpractice Crisis: How It's Hurting Medical Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May
26, 1975, at 32 (reviewing a strike by San Francisco anesthesiologists); see also When Doctors Rebel
Against Higher Insurance Costs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1976, at 36 (discussing a work
slowdown by L.A. County doctors and proposed insurance rate hike of 486%).
Not everyone, however, agreed that a crisis existed. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &
WELFARE, THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 109
(1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT] (medical malpractice was perceived as a "crisis" only by
the medical profession); see also Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859 (1976); see also Jones v.
State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859 (1976) ("It is argued that the Act is a necessary legislative
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industry.I6 In an effort to stabilize rising medical malpractice insurance
premiums, the legislature imposed a 250,000 dollar limit on the amount
recoverable for noneconomic damages. 17
Because MICRA limits recovery in medical malpractice cases but not
in other personal injury cases, MICRA arguably violates the equal pro-
tection clause. Article I of the California Constitution18 and the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution19 guarantee persons
equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause does not re-
quire absolute equal treatment in legislation. Rather, equal protection
requires that similarly situated individuals be treated alike.2" Whether a
legislative classification may treat differently those who are similarly situ-
response to a 'crisis' in medical malpractice insurance in Idaho, but the record does not demonstrate
any such 'crisis.' ").
15. The medical malpractice insurance crisis was not peculiar to California. Rather, it was a
national concern. By 1977, virtually every state had enacted or considered legislation aimed at
resolving the insurance crisis. T. LOMBARDI, JR., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 118-19
(1978).
16. Commentators have suggested many different causes of the crisis. Some commentators, for
example, assert that an increase in the number of medical malpractice claims precipitated the crisis.
See, e.g., Gray, The Insurer's Dilemma, 51 IND. L.J. 120, 120-21 (1974). Other commentators claim
the increase in the dollar amount ofjudgments rendered made insurance rates impossible to predict.
See Introduction: The Indiana Act in Context, 1975 Indiana Medical Act, 51 IND. L.J. 91, 94 (1975)
("the unpredictability of jury awards are said to render intelligent ratemaking impossible").
17. See supra note 9. In addition to limiting recovery for noneconomic damages, the legislation
also (1) limits the amount of contingency fees an attorney can contract for or collect in a professional
suit, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (Deering 1982); (2) repeals the "collateral source rule"
making admissible evidence of collateral compensation, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (Deering
1982); (3) reduces the statute of limitations to three years following the date of injury or one year
after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury, whichever occurs first, see CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (Deering 1982); (4) imposes certain notice requirements, See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 364(a) (Deering 1982); and (5) provides for periodic payment of future damages, see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (Deering 1982).
18. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a): "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property...
or [be] denied equal protection of the laws." The California Supreme Court has construed the equal
protection clause of the California Constitution as "substantially the equivalent" of the equal protec-
tion clause of the Federal Constitution. See Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d
586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1962).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
20. Whitaker v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 357, 365-68, 438 P.2d 358, 364-65, 66 Cal. Rptr.
710, 717-18 (1968) (so long as a classification "does not permit one to exercise the privilege while
refusing it to another of like qualifications, under like conditions, and circumstances, it is unobjec-
tionable upon [equal protection] grounds"). "The equal protection clause requires that persons
under like circumstances be given equal protection and security in the enjoyment of personal and
civil rights, the acquisition and enjoyment of property, the enforcement of contracts and the preven-
tion and redress of wrongs; and that they be subject to similar taxes and penalties." 5 B. WITKIN,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ated usually depends upon the standard of review exercised by the
C~ 2 1
court .2
Courts in six states have considered equal protection challenges to
statutes limiting recovery in medical malpractice cases. The courts, how-
ever, have not applied a uniform standard of review.22 In Carson v. Mau-
rer,2 3 the New Hampshire Supreme Court employed a "means focused"
equal protection inquiry24 to invalidate a statute imposing a 250,000 dol-
lar limitation on the amount recoverable for noneconomic damages.25
The court concluded that the necessary relationship between the legisla-
tive purpose and the means chosen to attain that purpose was weak.26
Although courts in Illinois,27 North Dakota,2 8 Ohio,29 and Texas30 have
invalidated on equal protection grounds damage award limitations, they
have not clearly articulated the standard of review employed.
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 336 (1980). See generally J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585-90 (2d ed. 1983).
Traditional equal protection analysis has generally employed two standards of review. The more
stringent standard, strict scrutiny, requires that the legislation be necessary to the promotion of a
compelling state interest. Generally, this test is utilized only when legislative classifications impinge
on certain suspect classes or fundamental interests. Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). The
second standard, mere rationality, requires only that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear
some rational relationship to some conceivable legitimate state purpose. See McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Despite the two traditional standards of review, courts have also applied a variety of intermediate
levels of scrutiny. See GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591 (1lth ed. 1985).
21. The higher the standard of review exercised by the court, the greater the likelihood that the
legislative classification will violate the equal protection clause.
22. Courts have traditionally applied a deferential standard of review when considering equal
protection challenges to economic and social welfare legislation. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
23. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
24. The court examined the strength of the relationship between the legislative goal and the
means chosen to attain that goal. Id. at 927, 424 A.2d at 828.
25. Id. at 926, 424 A.2d at 826.
26. The court found this relationship weak for two reasons: (1) damage awards only account
for a small portion of premium costs and (2) a few individuals actually suffer noneconomic damages
in excess of $250,000. Id. at 929, 424 A.2d at 830.
27. Wright v. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) ($500,000 limitation
on damages for personal injuries held unconstitutional).
28. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (statute allowing insurance companies to
limit total liability in a policy year to $300,000 held unconstitutional).
29. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pleas 1976)
($200,000 limitation on general damages held unconstitutional).
30. Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Tex., Inc. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App. 1984) ($500,000
limitation on hospital liability held unconstitutional).
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The Indiana Supreme Court, in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital Inc.,3 1
applied yet another standard, rejecting an equal protection challenge to a
500,000 dollar limitation on damages recoverable in medical malpractice
actions.32 The court determined that the legislative classification must
not be "arbitrary or unreasonable" and that "a fair and substantial rela-
tionship [must] exist between the classification and the purpose of the
legislation." '33 The court concluded that the limitation on recovery could
rationally be considered by the legislature to be an "essential part" of a
plan to "spread the risk of loss" suffered by health care providers.34
On three occasions, the California Supreme Court has rejected equal
protection challenges to three separate MICRA provisions. In each case,
the court employed the rational relation test to determine whether the
challenged provision violated the equal protection clause. In American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc.,35
the court held that MICRA's provision for periodic payment of future
damages36 did not violate the equal protection clause.37 After noting the
problems created by large lump sum damage awards, the court con-
cluded that periodic payment of future damages was rationally related to
the goal of reducing costs to medical malpractice defendants.38
31. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
32. Id. at 377, 404 N.E.2d at 587.
33. Id. The court explained that when neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification
is involved, courts defer to legislative judgment. Id. at 390, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
34. Id.
35. 37 Cal. 3d 146, 683 P.2d 670, 211 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1984).
36. This provision provides in pertinent part:
In any action for injury or damages against a provider of health care services, a superior
court shall, at the request of either party, enter a judgment ordering that money damages
or its equivalent for future damages of the judgment creditor be paid in whole or in part by
periodic payments rather than by a lump sum payment if the award equals or exceeds fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) in future damages.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (Deering 1982).
Several commentators have advocated the legislative adoption of a "periodic payment" procedure
as a reform measure that would benefit both plaintiffs and defendants. See Henderson, Periodic
Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734 (1980). See generally Elliget, The Periodic
Payment of Judgments, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 130 (1979).
37 37 Cal. 3d at 162, 683 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385. The state supreme courts in New
Hampshire and Wisconsin have addressed the constitutionality of similar periodic payment provi-
sions. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie,
81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). Both courts utilized the rational basis test and held that the
statutes did not violate the equal protection clause.
38. 37 Cal. 3d at 155, 683 P.2d at 678, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 380. The court found that large lump
sum awards required insurance companies to retain large reserves to pay judgments. The adoption
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Barme v. Wood,39 the court explicitly relied on the deferential stan-
dard of review applied in American Bank' The court held that the
MICRA provision4' that precluded a "collateral source" from recouping
medical expenses and benefits from a medical malpractice defendant did
not violate the equal protection clause.4" Finally, in Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, Inc. ,4 the court reviewed an equal protection challenge to a stat-
utory limit on attorneys' contingency fees' in medical malpractice ac-
tions.4 5 The court again applied the rational relation test, holding that
the legislation was rationally related46 to the legislative purpose.47
of a periodic payment procedure would permit insurers to retain fewer liquid reserves and thereby to
increase the capital available for investments. Id.
39. 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689 P.2d 446, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1984). The plaintiff, a police officer,
suffered a heart attack while on duty. During heart surgery, he sustained brain damage. He subse-
quently sued his physicians, alleging that his brain damage was due to their negligence. The City of
Huntington, a self-insured workers' compensation carrier, intervened. The city sought to recover
expenses it had incurred in providing workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff. Id. at 176, 689
P.2d at 447, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
The city argued that the elimination of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions
denies equal protection by: (1) granting benefits to medical malpractice victims that are not granted
to other tort victims, and (2) imposing a burden on employers who provide benefits to victims of
medical malpractice that is not imposed on other employers. Id. at 182, 689 P.2d at 451, 207 Cal.
Rptr. at 826:
40. Id. at 183, 689 P.2d at 451, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1(b) (Deering 1982).
42. The court stated that the statutory changes at issue were constitutionally limited to medical
malpractice actions because that was the area in which the crisis arose. The legislature could have
reasonably believed that the statute would help reduce the expenses of medical malpractice insurers
by shifting costs to other insurers. 37 Cal. 3d at 183, 689 P.2d at 451, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
43. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
44. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (Deering 1982). In brief, the statute limits the amount of
contingency fees that an attorney can contract for or collect in a professional negligence suit. Specif-
ically, the statute limits contingency fees to: (1) 40% of the first $50,000 recovered, (2) 33 1/3% of
the next $50,000 recovered, (3) 25% of the next $50,000 recovered, and (4) 10% of any amount by
which the recovery exceeds $200,000. Id.
45. The plaintiffs argued that the provision violated the equal protection clause by imposing
limits on the fees that plaintiffs' attorneys could charge, without imposing comparable limits on the
fees that defense counsel could charge. 37 Cal. 3d at 926, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
46. The court found three constitutionally sufficient rationales. First, the legislature could have
reasonably determined that the provision would promote lower settlements. Second, due to the
disproportionate number of defense verdicts in the medical malpractice field, the provision would
discourage frivilous suits and thereby reduce litigation costs for medical malpractice defendants.
Finally, because the statute limited a victim's damage recovery, the legislature could have reasonably
concluded that a limitation on contingency fees would be an "appropriate means of protecting the
already diminished compensation" of medical malpractice plaintiffs. Id.
47. According to the court, the legislature had determined that the high cost of medical mal-
practice insurance premiums threatened to curtail the availability of medical care in the state and
created a situation in which patients, injured by medical malpractice, might not have sufficient liabil-
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In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,48 the California Supreme Court
applied the same deferential standard of review to an equal protection
challenge to a statutory limitation on noneconomic damages recoverable
in medical malpractice actions. The majority relied heavily on the
court's previous decision in American Bank, finding that the classifica-
tions created by the limitation on recoverable damages were rationally
related to the legislative purpose.49
The court rejected the assertion that the 250,000 dollar limit unconsti-
tutionally distinguished plaintiffs with less than 250,000 dollars in
noneconomic damages from plaintiffs with more than 250,000 dollars in
noneconomic damages." Judge Kaus, writing for the court, listed three
legislative rationales to support the constitutionality of the statute. 1
First, the 250,000 dollar limit would provide a more stable basis to calcu-
late insurance rates. 2 Second, the statutory ceiling would help promote
settlements, thereby reducing litigation costs. 3 Finally, an across-the-
board limitation would be fairer than total elimination of recovery for
noneconomic damages. 4
ity insurance to cover damages sustained. The legislature enacted MICRA to meet these problems,
providing a series of measures aimed at reducing costs to medical malpractice insurers. Id.
48. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
49. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
50. Id. Fein argued that the limitation on damages violates the equal protection clause because
(1) it impermissibly discriminated between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims, (2) it
improperly discriminated between medical malpractice plaintiffs with economic damages and those
with noneconomic damages, and (3) it impermissibly denied "complete" recovery of damages only to
those malpractice plaintiffs with noneconomic damages exceeding $250,000. Id.
The court quickly disposed of the argument that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated
against medical malpractice victims. The court reiterated its conclusions in American Bank, Barnes,
and Roa. stating that the legislature could constitutionally limit the statute to medical malpractice
because that is the area in which the crisis arose. Id.
The court also quickly disposed of the argument that the statute violated the equal protection
clause by denying complete recovery only to malpractice victims with noneconomic damages. The
court concluded that the equal protection clause does not require the legislature to "limit a victim's
recovery for out-of-pocket medical expenses or lost earnings" simply because the legislature also
limited "damages for pain and suffering and similar noneconomic losses." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court noted the inherent unpredictability of noneconomic damage awards. The
unpredictability, according to the court, stemmed from the difficulty in valuing pain and suffering
and the large disparity in jury awards. Id.
54. Id. The court asserted that the legislature could have believed that the fixed $250,000 limit
would promote settlements by "eliminating the possibility of phenomenal awards for pain and suffer-
ing that can make litigation worth the gamble." Id.
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In a strident dissent, Chief Justice Bird5 criticized the majority's deci-
sion, arguing that the limitation could not survive "any serious and genu-
ine judicial inquiry into the correspondence between the classification
and the legislative goals." 56  Although the Chief Justice acknowledged
the legitimacy of the legislative purpose, she rejected each of the possible
legislative rationales posited by the majority.57 In addition, Chief Justice
Bird argued that the statute created a class of persons, plaintiffs suffering
noneconomic damages greater than 250,000 dollars, that was
underinclusive 8
The dissent's analysis is flawed for three reasons. First, the Chief Jus-
tice failed to refute the legislative rationales posited by the majority. She
asserted that the rationales were invalid because they would apply to any
limitation on damages. Equal protection doctrine, however, does not
require the legislature to have a unique justification for every classifica-
tion that it creates. The equal protection clause only requires that a
given classification have a rational relationship with the legislative
goals.5 9
Second, Chief Justice Bird's finding that the classification was underin-
clusive did not mean that such a classification was unconstitutional.
Even if a classification is underinclusive, it may still be constitutional if it
is rationally related to a legislative purpose.60
Finally, the dissent's position reflects a misunderstanding of the role of
the judiciary when economic or social welfare legislation is challenged on
55. Id. The court also asserted that the legislature could have believed it to be fairer to plain-
tiffs to reduce only the very large noneconomic damage awards, rather than to diminish modest
recoveries for pain and suffering. Id.
56. Justice Wood concurred with Chief Justice Bird's dissent. Justice Mosk wrote a separate
dissent.
57. Chief Justice Bird characterized the court's decision as "depriving" victims of medical neg-
ligence of compensation for proven noneconomic damages greater than $250,000. She also charac-
terized MICRA as "arbitrarily singling out a few injured patients to be stripped of important and
well-established protections against negligently inflicted harm." Id. at 167, 695 P.2d at 687, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 391.
58. Id. at 170, 695 P.2d at 691, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The Chief Justice declared the first two
rationales invalid because they would apply to any restriction on recovery. To the Chief Justice,
judicial acceptance of such broad rationales would render judicial scrutiny meaningless. The Chief
Justice also rejected the majority's "fairness rationale," stating "[t]he notion that the Legislature
might have concentrated the burden on the most severely injured victims out of considerations of
fairness certainly has the advantage of originality." Id.
59. According to the dissent, the classification created by the statute was underinclusive. The
dissent implied that the legislative purpose could be better achieved by calling on a sacrifice from a
larger class of plaintiffs. Id.
60. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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equal protection grounds. The essence of Chief Justice Bird's opinion
was that the statute was unfair. The Chief Justice's attempt to find the
statute unconstitutional was little more than an attempt to substitute ju-
dicial wisdom for that of the legislature.
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, the California Supreme Court
reached a logical and well-supported result. The court remained consis-
tent with its recent decisions upholding the constitutionality of other
MICRA provisions. Most importantly, the majority properly limited ju-
dicial review of economic legislation, requiring statutory classifications to
bear a rational relationship to the legislative purpose.6 1
A.J .
61. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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